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I. INTRODUCTION
For much of the past two decades, the intentionalist approach to
statutory interpretation has been on the defensive. Dating roughly from
Justice Scalia’s appointment to the Supreme Court, textualist judges and
scholars have seized the theoretical high ground, successfully framing
the debate in both constitutional and conceptual terms.1 Proponents of
* Newton D. Baker-Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, The Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law. I am grateful to Doug Berman, Steve Huefner, and Dan Tokaji
for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Katie Downing, Hilary March, and Melanie
Oberlin provided valuable research assistance, and Jennifer Pursell furnished able
secretarial support. The Moritz College of Law contributed generous financial assistance.
1. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 14–37 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61 (1994); Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History
be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 812–14 (1998); ADRIAN
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intentionalism and its key interpretive resource, legislative history, have
often responded from a more pragmatic than theoretical standpoint.2
At the same time, there has been an undercurrent of foundational
justifications offered for intentionalism, an undercurrent that has gained
strength in recent years. Some scholars have promoted the constitutional
legitimacy of an intentionalist approach, grounding their claims in
Congress’s powers of self-organization under Article I3 or in the
decentralized and specialized structure of Congress itself.4 Others have
argued for the conceptual integrity of intentionalism by invoking the
principle of constructive notice: they urge courts to identify a hierarchy
of legislative history resources based on which legislative record evidence
in a given setting is likely to be viewed as authoritative among reasonably
attentive congressional colleagues.5 Advocates for an intentionalist approach
have applied lessons from political science,6 democratic constitutionalism,7
analytic philosophy,8 and developmental psychology9 to help justify the
existence and importance of a collective legislative purpose that can
illuminate statutory meaning under the right conditions.

VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL
INTERPRETATION 40–79 (2006); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation
Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997).
2. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 847 (1992); Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of
Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1920–31 (2006); William N. Eskridge, Jr., No
Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2043–44, 2057–70 (2006) (reviewing VERMEULE,
supra note 1). See generally Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 252–58 (1992).
3. See John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical
Textualism, Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
489, 542–66 (2001); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of
Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1489–1516 (2000).
4. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretation
of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26–32 (1994);
McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation,
80 GEO. L.J. 705, 718–27 (1992); Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative
History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 264–70.
5. See generally George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other “Benign
Fictions”: The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other
Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 60–73; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 636–40 (1990).
6. See, e.g., Tiefer, supra note 4, at 268 (invoking political science research on
institutional role of committees as producers and suppliers of superior information that
enables each chamber to function in setting of uncertainty).
7. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 15–16, 85–101 (2005).
8. See Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of
Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 437–42 (2005); Tiefer,
supra note 4, at 255–64.
9. See Solan, supra note 8, at 449–53.
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The Interpretive Lessons article by Professors Boudreau, Lupia,
McCubbins, and Rodriguez (referred to at times as BLM Rod)10 represents
a valuable contribution to this recent intentionalist turn. Drawing on
insights from communication theory, the authors analogize statutes to
other forms of verbal and even nonverbal exchange that involve the
initial compression and subsequent expansion of information.11 Given
that statutes, as written communications, invariably require some interpretive
effort to unpack their meaning, certain reference points beyond the
words themselves become important. For BLM Rod, a core reference
point is the intent of Congress as communicator.
The authors maintain that statutes, as compressed substantive or
procedural commands,12 cannot be adequately understood without an
appreciation for the compression process that generated them.13 Relatedly,
BLM Rod contend that the decoding and elaborating of statutory commands
also must be properly sensitive to the dynamics of the compression
process, and they offer guidelines for courts to use when expanding the
meaning of statutes in particular settings.14
This essay comments on several of the authors’ major contentions.
Part I explores certain implications of the article’s thematic focus—that
a statutory communication derives at least some of its meaning from the
intent of Congress as communicator. Part I discusses how this approach
may help clarify the status of legislative history as evidence of ascribed
or imputed intent. In addition, Part I addresses how the authors’ focus
may augment the value placed on legislative history when compared to
interpretive resources generated by the judicial and executive branches
of federal government.
Part II examines the article’s treatment of the compression and expansion
procedures. It suggests that BLM Rod’s view of the compression process as
a relatively straightforward conversation among majority party legislators
may be unduly House-centered and also may overlook other variables.
10. Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez,
What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from Positive Theories of Communication and
Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957 (2007). My shorthand reference to the four
authors derives its respectful provenance through Alex Rodriguez (A-Rod), powerful
interpreter of pitchers for the New York Yankees, and Francisco Rodriguez (K-Rod),
fearsome interpreter of batters for the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim.
11. See id. at 961–64.
12. Id. at 964–67.
13. Id. at 967–71.
14. Id. at 971–81.
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Relevant congressional conversations often involve members of the
minority party, especially in the Senate. Further, the architecture of such
conversations may differ across subject matter areas more than the
authors’ basic model seems to contemplate. Part II also addresses the
process of expansion, focusing on the authors’ approach to conversations
among a bill’s coalition of supporting members. It suggests that BLM
Rod’s analyses of what motivates ardent and pivotal supporters, and of
how courts should treat these two key groups when elaborating the
meaning of text, may be in need of some refinement.
II. CONGRESS AS COMMUNICATOR
A. Group Communicators and Intent
One can point to several respects in which statutes may express the
intent of their legislative creators. At the most general level, statutes set
forth rules, standards, prohibitions, and entitlements that are enacted in
order to channel or direct human conduct toward broadly envisioned
policy consequences. Somewhat more specifically, certain statutes are
aimed at the conduct of the public as a whole, while others target subsets
that consist of private individuals and entities, governmental organizations,
or both. Still more concretely, straightforward federal prohibitions (such
as making it unlawful for employers to refuse to hire individuals
“because of . . . national origin”)15 or entitlements (such as authorizing
individuals to sue any person “alleged to be in violation of” various
environmental standards)16 often cannot be understood or applied simply
through logical deduction. When construing written language that is
inconclusive in a particular setting, it is appropriate to ask what the
author meant to communicate.
This concept of authorial intent is relevant to understanding a
communication whether the author is an individual or a group. For
example, consider the issue of hiring based on national origin. Assume
first that as personnel director for a business in San Diego, I tell my
recruitment coordinator: “Do not hire anyone who isn’t a U.S. citizen.”
In deciding whether I as an individual intended to discriminate on the
basis of national origin, more context is needed. Many individuals born
in other countries immigrate to the United States and become American
citizens. Thus, my order is not automatically or obviously discriminatory

15.
16.
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against the foreign-born.17 But now assume as well that ninety-eight
percent of the company’s all-white workforce was born in the United
States; that two-thirds of the individuals in the San Diego area qualified
for and interested in my company’s jobs were born in Mexico or Central
America; and that half of those are lawful resident aliens, who are eligible to
work for my company but are not citizens. Under these circumstances, it
appears more likely that I intended to exclude job applicants based on
their national origin.
Similarly, in deciding whether a federal statute that prohibits employment
discrimination based on national origin applies to refusals to hire noncitizens,
more context is needed.18 The statute does not mention citizenship at all,
and on its face the word citizen refers to whether a person has certain
rights and privileges in the U.S. political system, not whether she or her
parents were born in this country. On the other hand, refusals to hire
noncitizens effectively operate to exclude only persons of a different
national origin. Facially neutral barriers that predictably yield such a
disparate result might at least raise a presumption of unlawful conduct,
calling for some kind of business justification.19 In this setting, where
the semantic meaning of enacted text is subject to reasonable disagreement,
it makes sense to ask what Congress might have intended when it chose
to include “national origin” but not “citizenship” in its list of prohibited
traits or qualities.20
BLM Rod rightly insist that it is not sufficient to regard statutes as a
disembodied textual product. Like other forms of communication, statutes
17. Cf. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 92–93 (1973) (holding that
employer’s refusal to hire a noncitizen applicant did not constitute employment
discrimination on the basis of national origin).
18. There may be intermediate levels at which determinations about intent require
contextual inquiry. For instance, one might ask whether—assuming I did intend to
exclude job applicants based on national origin—that intent may be ascribed to my
company under some notion of vicarious liability. See generally Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802–07 (1998).
19. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971).
20. See Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 88–91 (reviewing statute’s “meager” legislative
history on this question and concluding that “national origin” was considered
synonymous with “ancestry” and that longstanding citizenship requirement for federal
employment was not viewed as conflicting with 1964 provision barring national origin
discrimination); see also Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.,
484 U.S. 49, 61–63 (1987) (relying on legislative history to show that private
enforcement actions discussed in text accompanying note 16, supra, were authorized
only to pursue injunctive relief against those allegedly still in violation of the Act, not to
seek redress for violations that are wholly past).
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can be adequately understood or applied only when viewed in context, as
the result of a communicative process.21 The intent of the communicator
is an integral part of that process, even when that communicator is a
group of 535 individuals acting in procedurally segmented stages over a
period of up to two years. The authors do not dwell on the philosophical
question of how such a large and unwieldy group can be said to possess
a coherent intent, but the recent work of Professor Lawrence Solan is
instructive in this regard.22
Solan discusses how we routinely regard groups—either formally
constituted or informally aggregated—as decision-making units imbued
with a collective mental state.23 We attribute emotions, beliefs, and
intentions to married couples or to residents in a neighborhood as well as
to members of a city council or a national legislature. Using a married
couple as his example, Solan describes how a husband and wife can be
“intending” to vacation at a particular resort hotel even if one spouse
plans most of the details or pays the bills, and even if the two spouses
anticipate that they will spend their vacation time in very different ways.24
Similarly, Solan argues, we consider larger groups such as legislatures to
be actors with an intent even when not every group member signs on
expressly to the legislative product, or when all the bill’s details have not
been worked out in advance, or when those endorsing the legislation
have relatively diverse reasons for doing so.25
To be sure, there are many potential groupings of individuals that do
not behave as unified or coherent actors. Female spouses who live in a
particular city, or state legislators from the Midwest who serve on
judiciary committees, are two examples of individuals unlikely to act
together on a regular or even occasional basis. As Professor Solan
observes, we are inclined to regard a collection of individuals as an
entity possessing a coherent intent primarily because they deliberate and
21. Some textualists contend that statutes must be viewed as a special form of
written communication—both because statutes are drafted to be fully self-contained as a
constitutional matter, and because any suggestion to the contrary provides incentives for
members of Congress to use legislative history in strategic or opportunistic ways. BLM
Rod’s response is presumably that it is simply not practical or realistic to expect
Congress to insert all communicative instructions into its statutory commands, and that
the authors’ conditions for sincerity can effectively screen for opportunistic legislative
history.
22. See Solan, supra note 8; see also Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits:
The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235, 251–62 (discussing
importance of context for resolving indeterminacies in language).
23. See Solan, supra note 8, at 437–49.
24. See id. at 437–40. Solan draws here on philosopher Margaret Gilbert’s work
on plural subject theory. Id. at 438 & nn.52–53 (quoting MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY
AND RESPONSIBILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN PLURAL SUBJECT THEORY 41 (2000)).
25. Id. at 444–49.
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act jointly as a unit.26 This inclination to attribute a group intent applies
even if the group’s deliberative processes are fragmented as an organizational
matter and its joint decisions are messy or complex. Congress is an apt
illustration of such jointly deliberative action from both the formal and
practical perspectives.
When BLM Rod emphasize the importance of heeding “the legislature’s
intended meaning” or “the meaning that the legislature intended to
convey,”27 they are relying on the concept of attributed group intent. It
makes sense to think of legislative intent as attributed or imputed rather
than “actual”: Congress is very unlikely to agree on an institutional intent
in formal terms. Fifty-one senators and two hundred and eighteen
representatives virtually never vote to endorse legislative record statements
the way they vote to approve text.28 Similarly, it is rare for the House or
Senate to convene members in a New England town meeting format, at
which all or almost all are present to hear everything that is said about a
bill before votes are taken.29
Instead, group intent derives from the structural and functional realities of
Congress as a representative body. Legislators effectively charge subgroups
of their colleagues with the primary responsibility for drafting a text and
explaining or elaborating upon its meaning. Formal subgroups like standing
committees or conference committees are assigned such roles based on
their subject matter and technical expertise and also their status as players
continuously invested in the field. Informal subgroups, like a bipartisan
coalition that negotiates a compromise, are trusted in these roles because
they reflect a reassuringly broad spectrum of ideological positions. The
conference committee report containing a reasoned narrative that is then
reiterated in floor debate before final passage,30 or the joint floor statement
26. Id. at 442–45.
27. Boudreau et al., supra note 10, at 961, 962.
28. But see Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat.
1071, 1075 (codifying a single legislative history statement as authoritative for helping
to understand the textual provision overriding Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989)). Congress’s textual language in this unusual setting makes clear the
background norm or default rule—members expect that unenacted legislative history
should be valued and that ordinarily a range of legislative record statements and
exchanges may be credited as a source of illumination.
29. House sessions in which members exercise the chamber’s power of impeachment,
and Senate sessions in which impeachment trials take place, are notable exceptions.
Floor debate during a foreign policy crisis may be another such exceptional circumstance.
30. See, e.g., Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951, 957 (9th
Cir. 1981) (relying on conference report narrative explaining meaning of Alaska Lands
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explaining a deal negotiated by bill managers and ranking minority
members,31 are ascribed to Congress as a whole. The attribution of group
intent occurs because the larger group must have intended—and would
have agreed if asked—that the text they approved means what their
designated colleagues said it means.
By depicting the legislative process as a mechanism that compresses
multiple sources of information into a single statutory command, the
authors enlarge our understanding of how Congress can intend to
communicate more than simply the final words of enacted text. At the
same time, BLM Rod emphasize that Congress’s group decisional process
is also a constitutive component in the Article I lawmaking enterprise.32
That emphasis deserves attention as well.
B. A Constitutionally Privileged Compression Procedure
Under our Constitution, as every law student learns,33 Congress is
authorized to develop and enact legislation, the President is charged with
the authority to execute these enacted laws, and federal courts are
responsible for resolving controversies that arise under the enacted and
implemented statutes.34 Although it is ultimately the Supreme Court’s
role to construe statutory text that results in contested understandings,
each of the three branches contributes contextual resources that regularly
assist the courts in addressing such disputes. These branch-specific
interpretive assets are legislative history, agency guidance mainly in the
form of rules or adjudications, and the canons of construction.35

Act, an explanation that was repeated on both House and Senate floor by conference
committee members and that became the basis for Senate’s receding from its prior
version of text).
31. See, e.g., Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104
Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623, 626, 629–630 (2000));
136 CONG. REC. 25352–55 (1990) (statement of Managers, Sens. Metzenbaum, Hatch,
Pryor, Heinz) (explaining in detail provisions of substitute text that followed eighteen
months of hearings, committee markups, and floor debates, and that preceded overwhelming
approval for the bill in both houses).
32. See Boudreau et al., supra note 10, at 961–62.
33. Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (referring to what “every
schoolchild learns” about our Constitutional system of dual sovereignty).
34. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; art. II, § 3; art. III, § 2.
35. I refer here primarily to language canons and substantive canons. See generally
James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2005). Another important court-generated
interpretive asset is judicial precedent and the norm of stare decisis. Because precedents
on statutory matters are themselves often based on a court’s understanding of legislative
history or on agency deference, they may be thought of as somewhat more hybrid in
origin.
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In recent times, a number of scholars and judges have assigned special
rule of law value to the canons. They praise language canons as contentneutral gap-filling norms that enhance the clarity of enacted law,36 and
extol substantive canons as policy-related presumptions that signal Congress
to draft with precision if it wishes to trump them.37 Similarly, deference
to agency decisions has received plaudits based on an assertedly special
link to democratic representation. Some judges and scholars regard agencies
as extensions of the President, carrying an electorally accountable pedigree
that is missing from federal courts.38 Unlike its interpretive resource
cousins, legislative history is often disparaged, based at least in part
on its politicized roots. Skeptics regard it as indeterminate and subject
to manipulation,39 lacking the presumptive reliability of the canons or
the cohesively representative quality of an agency rule.
Ignoring for present purposes the persuasiveness of claims made on
behalf of other branches’ interpretive assets,40 it is worth noting how
BLM Rod’s approach advocates a special role for legislative history.
Not only is the lawmaking enterprise best understood as a series of
legislative tasks through which meaning is compressed;41 the authors
regard this extended institutional conversation as a constitutionally
privileged part of Congress’s legislative process. Article I of the Constitution
authorizes each House to determine its own procedures for how bills are
36. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court,
1993 Term—Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 66–67 (1994);
Scalia, supra note 1, at 25–27.
37. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 36, at 68–69; David L. Shapiro,
Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 943–45
(1992). See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING
THE REGULATORY STATE 147–57 (1990).
38. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865–66 (1984); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833, 833–34 (2001); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make
Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 865–
68 (2006).
39. See Manning, supra note 1, at 696–706 (criticizing legislative history as
indeterminate); Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 61 (criticizing legislative history as subject
to manipulation); Scalia, supra note 1, at 31–36 (criticizing legislative history on both
grounds).
40. For empirical perspectives skeptical of normative claims asserted on behalf of
the canons and agency deference, see Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 35, at 77–112
(focusing on canons); Miles & Sunstein, supra note 38, at 824–47 (focusing on agency
deference). See generally Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive
Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 1979–2002 (2007).
41. See Boudreau et al., supra note 10, at 970–71.
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introduced, discussed, modified, and approved, and also to maintain and
publish a record of the proceedings that culminate in enactments.42 The
House and Senate have structured their respective rules and practices to
value some proceedings more than others, and members and their staffs
participate in a resultant hierarchy of internal communications.
Perhaps the most familiar example of this hierarchy is committee
reports. For over a century, standing committee recommendations that a
bill be considered and approved by the full chamber have been accompanied
by written reports.43 Committee reports typically include a brief statement
of the bill’s purpose, an extended explanation of why the bill is needed
to address a particular public policy problem, and a detailed description
of the bill’s key components. As informational and persuasive documents,
these reports can play an important role for legislators and staff who are
not committee members.
Committee reports ordinarily are published and circulated at least two
calendar days in advance of legislation being taken up on the floor.44
This allows time for members to review the reports before they are asked
to vote on the bill or any amendments, and legislators from both the
majority and minority have indicated that they engage in such review.45
42. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2–3.
43. See WM. HOLMES BROWN & CHARLES W. JOHNSON, HOUSE PRACTICE 281
(2003) (dating House requirement from 1880); Thomas F. Broden, Jr., Congressional
Committee Reports: Their Role and History, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 209, 237–38 (1958)
(dating Senate majority practice from 1900). See generally WOODROW WILSON,
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 69 (Meridian Books 1956) (1885) (writing in 1883 that
“Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committeerooms is Congress at work”).
44. See COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE
STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 107-1, R. 17, para. 5, at 17 (1st Sess. 2002). This
period of two days is exclusive of Sundays and legal holidays. Id. See JOHN H.
SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 108-241, R. 13(4)(a)(1), at 623 (2d Sess. 2005)
(same).
45. See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L. REV.
181, 184 (1986) (discussing reliance on reports when a majority member of House);
Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 43, 46–48 (1988) (discussing the same when a minority member of Senate);
Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 21 (1990) (statement of Judge James L. Buckley, referring to
reliance when a minority member of Senate); Joan Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow
View in Seeking Congress’ Will, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 913, 917 (1990) (summarizing
Sen. Arlen Specter’s views as follows: “[M]embers of Congress are more likely to read a
committee report than the bill itself. The prose of a report is easier to understand, and,
because a bill usually amends an existing statute, it is impossible to follow without
referring to the U.S. Code.”); see also Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 223–25 (1994) (remarks of Sen. William S. Cohen,
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In addition, legislative staff may rely on the reports to assist them in
educating and advising their bosses about bills that are headed for the
floor. By examining a committee report’s presentation of historical
background and policy rationale, its discussion of a bill’s major and
minor features, and the possible presence of minority views offering
arguments against enactment, staff can develop for their principals a
succinct presentation of what the legislation is really about, and why
certain knowledgeable senators and representatives are supporting or
opposing it.46
This is not a contention—by BLM Rod or me—that Congress is
delegating its formal lawmaking role to committees as its agents.
Rather, due to the inherent ambiguities of language and the challenges of
navigating a contingent political process, statutory text as drafted and
voted on often cannot be self-explanatory. In that setting, Congress’s
designated agents fulfill a communicative function on an ex ante basis,
one that can have substantial value for other members and their staffs.
The same legislative record material also may be helpful to a postenactment audience of agencies, regulated entities, and courts that is
seeking to anticipate, avoid, or resolve controversies about statutory
meaning. The material’s ex post value, however, derives primarily from
its ex ante function: legislative history is probative on the subject of
intent insofar as it reflects the priorities, justifications, and compromises

supporting role of legislative history in discerning Congress’s intent); Nomination of
David H. Souter, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 130–32 (1991) (remarks of
Sen. Dennis DeConcini, supporting relevance of legislative history in understanding
statutory meaning).
46. As a former subcommittee counsel and staff director on the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee from 1985–1992, I can attest to my own reliance on
committee reports from other subject matter areas to help brief senators on my
committee, and also to the frequency with which staff for members not on our committee
would raise questions or arguments with me, based on what they had read in our
committee’s report, as they prepared memos for their bosses. Committee reports today
are available electronically, making them more accessible to members and staffs.
Whether reports serve as central an informational function now that so many other
relevant briefing materials are accessible online (hearing testimony, party caucus
presentations, interest group submissions) is an empirical question that deserves
attention. See generally WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE
POLICY PROCESS 106 (7th ed. 2007) (describing committee reports as “directed primarily
at House and Senate members” and as “the principal official means of communicating a
committee decision to the entire chamber”).
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that may be reasonably understood to have been part of the group’s
deliberative effort preceding enactment.
This perspective of assessing legislative record evidence as part of
Congress’s constitutionally privileged communicative process also has
implications for how one values other interpretive resources. For example,
recent empirical scholarship raises doubts as to whether the canons of
construction play much of a role when legislative text is being drafted or
debated.47 Legislative committee counsel describe drafting statutory language
as a highly contextual and intensely pressured process, one that does not
readily accommodate generalized rules of construction aimed at promoting
predictability.48 From the standpoint of statutes as compressed commands,
it would seem that the canons’ putative virtues have not been embraced
by those who formulate and present the commands themselves.
In contrast to the sidelines stance of judicially created canons, executive
branch agencies are often participants in the legislative conversation,
directly through committee hearing testimony and indirectly through
negotiations with key congressional players. But when, as is so often the
case, Congress and the White House are controlled by different parties,49
agency interpretations following enactment may well face objection for
being in conflict with what legislative history suggests the bill’s supporters
had in mind.50 In short, one implication of the authors’ premise about
the constitutionally privileged role of communicative intent is a subtle
discounting of interpretive resources produced by the two other
branches. That implied critique may in turn suggest a more elevated
status for legislative history, esteemed perhaps as a first among equals.
The interpretive importance ascribed to communicative intent does
presuppose that a disinterested observer will be able to decipher or
translate what Congress as communicator has in mind. BLM Rod are

47. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 600–05 (2002) (finding that counsel
involved in drafting text are aware of canons, but do not view them as an important
factor in process of writing and discussing statutory language).
48. See id. at 590–600; see also Boudreau et al., supra note 10, at 983–86
(discussing how redundancy is an important part of legislative communication,
mistakenly ignored or devalued by courts’ use of the Whole Act Rule).
49. Between 1968 and 2008, Congress (at least one chamber) and the Presidency
have been controlled by different parties 75% of the time—all years except 1977–1980,
1993–1994, and 2003–2006.
50. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586–600
(2004) (relying on legislative history for statute enacted by Democratic Congress and
rejecting as “clearly wrong” agency regulation adopted under subsequent Republican
President); Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36–38 (1990) (same); Commc’ns
Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 744–63 (1988) (relying on legislative history for statute
enacted by Republican Congress and rejecting agency’s settled interpretation of the
statutory provision, developed under later Democratic Presidents).
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sensitive to this issue, and they offer guidance on how legislative record
evidence should be decoded, at both the compression and expansion
stages. Those guidelines raise intriguing questions, several of which are
discussed below.
III. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON COMPRESSION AND EXPANSION
A. Accommodation and Diversity in the Compression Process
For BLM Rod, the defining aspect of how legislative conversations in
Congress contribute to an enacted statute is the virtually untrammeled
power exercised by the majority party.51 Although their schematic
presentation and descriptive treatment focus on the House of Representatives,
the authors refer in broader terms to the majority party’s wholesale
dominance of the congressional process. BLM Rod are certainly correct
that the majority party’s control of the agenda at committee, floor, and
conference stages, and its advantage in terms of staffing and other
resources, enable it to exert primary influence over the tenor and content
of pre-enactment communications.
At the same time, however, the minority party’s role in these legislative
conversations is more salient than the authors’ discussion tends to suggest.
A number of institutional and behavioral factors contribute to the often
intricately bipartisan nature of Congress’s communications process. Three
factors that warrant brief attention here are the presence of supermajority
barriers that must be cleared in the Senate, the majority party’s need to
obtain minority party support when its own caucus is divided, and the
special importance that majority leaders sometimes attach to securing
bipartisan agreement.
First and foremost, the House and Senate differ markedly in terms of
how legislative conversations take place. In the House, a cohesive majority
party can—if it prefers—develop legislation without consulting the
minority at all; as a result the Speaker and minority leader may go for
months without having any direct communication.52 By contrast, various
Senate rules and customs empower small groups and even individual
members with a daunting array of weapons to delay or defeat pending
51. See Boudreau et al., supra note 10, at 968–71, 979–80, 987.
52. See Barbara Sinclair, The New World of U.S. Senators, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED
1, 13 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 8th ed. 2005); C. Lawrence
Evans & Daniel Lipinski, Obstruction and Leadership in the U.S. Senate, in CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED, supra, at 227, 238.
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legislation. Accordingly, the Senate cannot function legislatively without
regular cooperation between the majority and minority leadership, and indepth interaction takes place on a daily basis among the leaders and their
respective staffs.53
Senators who belong to the minority party regularly use obstructionist
procedural tactics to assist them in bargaining over the substance of
legislative provisions.54 When a bill is slated for consideration by the
full Senate, minority members often invoke filibusters or the threat of
filibusters to extract substantive concessions.55 The minority also offers
large numbers of amendments on the floor as a pressure tactic that at
times leads to legislative compromise.56 Similarly, because the Senate
generally relies on unanimous consent agreements to schedule floor
consideration in the first instance, small numbers of senators—usually
from the minority party—can place “holds” on a bill and then remove
the holds after negotiating to address specific legislative concerns.57
Importantly, the ability of minority party senators to postpone or
prevent bills from moving forward on the floor also may trigger
anticipatory bargaining, as committee chairs and subchairs seek to avoid
problems from intensely interested senators outside the committee.58
Further, at the conference committee stage, Senate conferees can credibly
resist the House version of a provision if minority party senators seem
likely to place a hold on the conference report unless they prevail on the
disputed language.59 In sum, while minority party senators are hardly equal
players with the majority, their access to obstructive techniques that are
recognized and deeply ingrained as part of Senate culture make them
regular participants on a scale not imaginable under House procedures.
A second element that enhances the role of minority party members is
the prospect of legislation that divides the majority party caucus in one
53. See Sinclair, supra note 52, at 13; Evans & Lipinski, supra note 52, at 238–39.
54. The discussion that follows relies on recent contributions analyzing Senate
operations, cited supra note 52. For similar observations and insights from earlier sources,
see generally Steven S. Smith & Gerald Gamm, The Dynamics of Party Government
in Congress, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 245, 263–65 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I.
Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001); Norman J. Ornstein et al., The U.S. Senate in an Era of
Change, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 13, 21–22 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer
eds., 5th ed. 1993); Steven S. Smith, Forces of Change in Senate Party Leadership and
Organization, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 259, 268–72 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I.
Oppenheimer eds., 5th ed. 1993); C. LAWRENCE EVANS, LEADERSHIP IN COMMITTEE 51–
52, 127–34 (1991). The tactics discussed in text accompanying notes 55 to 59 may be
used to defeat legislation as well as to modify its terms—my interest here is in the latter.
55. See Sinclair, supra note 52, at 6–7; Evans & Lipinski, supra note 52, at 229–
32.
56. See Sinclair, supra note 52, at 8–9.
57. See id. at 10–11; Evans & Lipinski, supra note 52, at 230–31.
58. See Sinclair, supra note 52, at 5; Evans & Lipinski, supra note 52, at 239.
59. See Evans & Lipinski, supra note 52, at 241.
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or both chambers. This is especially likely in the Senate, where party
discipline is not as strict, and centrist or moderate members from either
party may defect from a majority legislative program. Campaign finance
reform60 and prescription drug legislation61 are recent instances where a
majority in the Senate, the House, or both could be cobbled together
only with participation from minority party members.62
To be sure, bipartisan and crosspartisan cooperation is less frequent
than it used to be, as political parties have become more ideologically
cohesive on a national scale and the House Republicans were able to
exert remarkably effective control of the legislative process during their
recent decade of power.63 Nonetheless, many major policy disagreements
in our large and heterogeneous country continue to reflect differences
that stem from population diversity, distribution of natural resources,
proximity to the Mexican border, or other factors not as readily
amenable to political party control. Legislative conversations involving
such matters are likely to include meaningful participation by minority
party members, apart from any residual pressures to achieve something
close to a procedural consensus for scheduling and related efficiency
purposes.

60. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(amending Federal Election Campaign Act); see 148 CONG. REC. 3623 (2002) (Rollcall
Vote No. 54 Leg.); 58 CONG. Q. ALMANAC PLUS S-14 (2002) (60–40; R 11–38; D 48–2;
I 1–0); 148 CONG. REC. 1418–19 (2002) (Roll No. 34); 58 CONG. Q. ALMANAC PLUS
H-16 (2002) (240–189; R 41–176; D 198–12; I 1–1).
61. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (amending Social Security Act to provide for a
prescription drug benefit under the Medicare program); see 149 CONG. REC. S15914–15
(daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003) (Rollcall Vote No. 459 Leg.); 59 CONG. Q. ALMANAC PLUS
S-82 (2003) (54–44; R 42–9; D 11–35; I 1–0); 149 CONG. REC. H12295–96 (daily ed.
Nov. 21, 2003) (Roll No. 669); 59 CONG. Q. ALMANAC PLUS H-204 (2003) (220–215;
R 204–25; D 16–189; I 0–1).
62. See generally Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, A Decade of
Republican Control: The House of Representatives, 1995–2005, in C ONGRESS
RECONSIDERED, supra note 52, at 23, 50; Joseph Cooper & Garry Young, Partisanship,
Bipartisanship, and Crosspartisanship in Congress Since the New Deal, in CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED 246, 268–71 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 6th ed.
1997).
63. See, e.g., Dodd & Oppenheimer, supra note 62, at 47–51; H.W. Perry & L.A.
Powe, Jr., The Political Battle for the Constitution, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 641, 645
(2004); Catherine E. Rudder, The Politics of Taxing and Spending in Congress: Ideas,
Strategy, and Policy, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 52, at 319, 327–34. Of
course, courts will continue to interpret major statutes enacted in the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s that were developed through bipartisan negotiation.
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A third factor promoting the role of minority party members is the
prospect that majority legislators may attach independent value to
enactment on a bipartisan basis even though the majority party can
secure passage without minority party votes. This kind of judgment may
reflect strategic calculations—bipartisan support may soften the Executive
branch’s inclination to engage in tough bargaining or veto threats, or it
may bind the political parties together on an issue that is likely to
alienate a portion of the electorate.64 Alternatively, moral considerations
may be implicated—bipartisan support may help educate the country
about what is the “right” thing to do from the standpoint of justice or
fairness, if not obvious self-interest.65
Finally, and apart from fluctuations in the role played by minority
party members, the architecture of legislative conversations culminating
in enactment also may vary based on the subject matter area being
addressed by Congress. Although each set of communications among key
members will have its own compression dynamic, pre-enactment discussion
is likely to feature greater complexity or nuance in some areas of federal
law than in others. There is reason to believe that the Supreme Court
may recognize such distinctions sub silentio when relying on legislative
history in different substantive fields.
For example, and at the risk of overgeneralizing, labor relations and
employment discrimination statutes tend to feature complex concepts
that are frequently codified in relatively expansive or open-ended language.
Although their basic purpose is to protect the rights of employees, these
statutes also typically include defenses or exceptions for certain good faith
business practices by employers. The final text often reflects substantial
bargaining between members from the two parties, or compromises between
the House and Senate.66
64. Bipartisan support for such strategic reasons may well occur with respect to tax
reform that increases taxes to be paid by some portions of the electorate, or trade
agreements that are likely to result in additional jobs in some sectors but fewer jobs in
others. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat.
2057 (1993).
65. Legislative debates about civil rights legislation or immigration reform are
likely illustrations for the presence of such moral considerations. See, e.g., Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359. There may be other situations, not
addressed here, where the minority party plays a more important communicative role
than BLM Rod have allowed for. One such possibility is the development of omnibus
legislation, in which Congress addresses a number of discrete issues through a single
statute that reflects logrolling among subgroups of members.
66. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT
110 (1964); Beth M. Henschen, Judicial Use of Legislative History and Intent in
Statutory Interpretation, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 353, 366 (1985). See also James J. Brudney
& Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy,
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Not surprisingly, the text of these workplace protection statutes may
well be accompanied by lengthy or detailed explanatory statements from
the committees or individual members responsible for negotiating various
language adjustments. Empirical research on Supreme Court use of
legislative history suggests that the Court has long understood the relevance
and value of such communications. Over a period of decades, the Justices
have relied especially heavily on legislative history to assist in justifying
Court decisions construing labor relations and race or sex discrimination
statutes.67
By contrast, recent federal criminal laws tend to involve less doctrinal
complexity and also less dealmaking among members. Illustrative in
this regard is the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), Title I of which restricts access to habeas corpus relief
and expedites postconviction procedures in a number of respects.68
Drafted and approved on a fast track following the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing, AEDPA was enacted by overwhelming majorities in both
Houses.69 While AEDPA’s Title I text limits postconviction rights
and timetables in various ways, the accompanying legislative history
communicates mainly in broad-brush and rhetorical terms.70 The Supreme
Court has applied the Title I provisions of AEDPA in over forty-five

and the Scalia Effect 34–36 (Ohio State Public Law Working Paper No. 95, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008330.
67. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative
History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89
JUDICATURE 220, 224 (2006) (reporting that from 1969 to 2006, Court majority opinions
relied on legislative history in 47% of 138 race or sex discrimination statutory cases, and
in 33% of 192 labor relations statutory cases); Henschen, supra note 66, at 360–61
(reporting that from 1950 to 1972, Court relied on legislative history in 38% of 124 labor
relations statutory cases as contrasted with 15% of 97 antitrust statutory cases).
68. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, §§ 101–108 (1996) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253–55, 2261–66 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
69. See Holly Idleson, Terrorism Bill is Headed to President’s Desk, 54 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1044 (1996). The final roll call vote included a solid majority of members
from both parties. See 142 CONG. REC. 7804–05 (1996) (Rollcall Vote No. 71 Leg.); 52
CONG. Q. ALMANAC S-15 (1996) (91–8; R 51–1; D 40–7); 142 CONG. REC. 7973 (1996)
(Roll No. 126); 52 CONG. Q. ALMANAC H-42 (1996) (293–133; R 188–46; D 105–86;
I 0–1). As part of this broad congressional consensus, Title I of the Act was approved by
the House and Senate in identical form. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996)
(Conf. Rep.) (reporting on S. 735, Terrorism Prevention Act).
70. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-23, at 8–11 (1995); H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, supra
note 69, at 111; 141 CONG. REC. 14524–26 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 141 CONG.
REC. 14654 (1995) (statement of Sen. Specter); 142 CONG. REC. 7954–55 (1996)
(statement of Rep. Solomon); 142 CONG. REC. 7961 (1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
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decisions since 1997; on only three occasions has a member of the
majority invoked the Act’s legislative history to help explain the Court’s
holding.71
The Court’s exceptionally low level of reliance on AEDPA legislative
history is doubtless attributable to factors besides the de minimis role of
pre-enactment communications in amplifying or elaborating the meaning
of text.72 Still, AEDPA seems fairly typical of recent federal statutes
imposing severe criminal penalties or curtailing procedural options for
criminals. Responding to short-term political pressures to “get tough”
on crime, Congress has enacted a series of straightforwardly restrictive
penal statutes.73 These laws have featured broad bipartisan approval,
with few if any qualifications expressed by supporters.74 Legislative
71. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 183 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399, 408 (2000) (O’Connor, J., writing for the
majority); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997) (Souter, J., writing for the
majority); see also Caldwell v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 431, 432 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
respecting denial of petition for certiorari). A list of forty-seven Supreme Court decisions
construing AEDPA Title I since June 1997 is on file and available from the author.
72. Among the factors that may be at work: (i) the Court in AEDPA cases tends to
state black letter law and apply it to specific facts at hand, and (ii) AEDPA supplements
a long history of jurisprudence under habeas corpus provisions so that the Court has a
great deal of precedent to which it refers. Many of the Supreme Court’s AEDPA
decisions address whether the Act’s statute of limitations should be tolled for one of
several reasons, or whether a state court adjudication “involved an unreasonable
application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
73. See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law For This Age of Federal Sentencing:
The Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 95, 99
(1999) (discussing enactment of mandatory sentencing provisions addressing different
federal crimes on seven occasions from 1986–1996); see also Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (imposing range
of special criminal and civil penalties on sex offenders).
The legislative history of recent criminal statutes is not always dominated by simple or
declamatory statements from key bill supporters. See Frank O. Bowman, Pour encourager
les autres? The Curious History and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 392–411 (2004) (discussing complexity of legislative history
accompanying criminal provisions of 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Kate Stith & Steve Y.
Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993) (discussing complexity of legislative
history accompanying 1984 Sentencing Reform Act). This variation in legislative
history within the criminal law field gives rise to several related questions that warrant
further inquiry: (i) whether Congress generates more informative or illuminating
legislative history for statutes focused on white collar criminal activity rather than on
crimes of violence; (ii) whether the Supreme Court and appellate courts rely on
legislative history more often when construing white collar criminal statutes than other
federal criminal law provisions; and (iii) whether litigants in the criminal justice field are
as likely to embrace or even refer to legislative history in their briefs as are litigants in
civil rights, labor relations, tax law, or other subject matter areas.
74. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, tit. VII, §§ 70001–02, 108 Stat. 1796, 1982–85 (codified primarily at 18
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conversations that help comprise the compression process for such
criminal statutes will tend to offer relatively little insight in terms of the
text’s policy instructions or procedural mandates beyond what is reasonably
apparent from the nature and specifics of the text itself.
My discussion of the compression process has addressed issues that
BLM Rod may well have concluded it was premature for them to explore.
Their article does not attempt to describe in depth how certain aspects of
congressional procedure or legislative substance may contribute to the
development of statutory commands. Moreover, the prospect that
compression dynamics vary meaningfully between House and Senate,
and among different subject matter areas, creates an additional challenge
for courts or agencies seeking to understand and make use of relevant
legislative conversations. Yet the fact that judgments about reliability may
be challenging does not mean such conversations are indeterminate or
incapable of being decoded. Interpretive judgments involving dictionaries,
canons of construction, and agency deference often involve close questions
on which reasonable judicial minds may differ.75 Similarly, when seeking
to understand the pre-enactment dialogue among legislators, one must
attend to both the narrow situational context and the applicability of
broader guidelines. Under this approach, legislative history will be at
times anecdotally unhelpful as to the meaning of enacted text, but there is
no reason to doubt its inherent value as part of the interpretive enterprise.
B. Ardent and Pivotal Supporters in the Expansion Process
BLM Rod recognize that courts must act as discerning reviewers of
legislative conversations if they are to decode statutory meaning on a
U.S.C. § 3559(c) (2000)) (providing for mandatory life imprisonment for third-time
violent felons); see 139 CONG. REC. 27822–26, 27834 (1993) (reporting Senate introduction,
discussion, and approval of provision as amendment by vote of 91–1); 140 CONG. REC.
8141 (1994) (reporting House approval of bill with “three strikes” provision by vote of
285–141); see also United States v. Mackovich, 209 F.3d 1227, 1239–40 (10th Cir.
2000) (declining to consider statute’s legislative history); United States v. Kaluna, 192
F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (finding that legislative history adds nothing
of value); United States v. Gottlieb, 140 F.3d 865, 870–71 n.7 (10th Cir. 1998) (same).
75. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127–34, 139–40 (1998)
(demonstrating Justices Breyer and Ginsburg differing on dictionary definition of verb
“carry”); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 836–37,
842–43, 845–46 (1988) (demonstrating Justices White and Kennedy differing on
consequences of applying Whole Act Rule); NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532
U.S. 706, 712–22, 724–28 (2001) (demonstrating Justices Scalia and Stevens differing
on appropriate nature and extent of deference to federal agency’s interpretation).
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regular basis. The conversations that have been compressed—like human
exchanges in general—are often subtly phrased, and key participants are
not always entirely forthcoming. Apart from focusing on the influential
majority party identity of particular speakers, the authors place special
emphasis on sincerity—by which they mean whether the speaker reveals
what she believes to be true, as opposed to concealing or even
misrepresenting her understanding of what the text covers, or what key
members agreed to, or any other aspect of the compression process.76
As BLM Rod insightfully observe, conditions for sincerity that depend
on institutional factors rather than the speaker’s personal attributes tend
to be more observable, and hence useful, to courts during the expansion
process.77 One such condition is the penalty for lying.78 Members in
leadership positions on a particular bill—committee chairs, floor
managers, even individual senators brokering compromise language on
behalf of a group of colleagues—are trusted by other members not to
misstate the bill’s general or specific objectives. Occasionally, deliberate
misrepresentations may result in formal institutional discipline, such as
loss of a leadership position.79
More important, though, are the informal incentives against lying that
exist within each chamber. Members are repeat players who typically
aspire to a long-term relationship with their colleagues and the institution.
The institution in turn depends upon the accuracy and adequacy of
information from relevant subgroups in advancing its agenda each
session. Thus, when members occupy positions of trust on a given bill
or amendment, the desire to establish or preserve a reputation for
fairness and honesty creates strong incentives for sincerity even during
partisan disputes.80 Further, just as certain factors encourage members not
to lie when communicating as recognized agents of the larger group,
congressional staff are likely to represent accurately their principals’
76. See Boudreau et al., supra note 10, at 974–75.
77. See id. at 975–76.
78. See id. at 976, 978. Discussion in this and the following two paragraphs draws
on my prior work assessing factors that may contribute to reliable legislative history.
See Brudney, supra note 4, at 50–51.
79. See Boudreau et al., supra note 10, at 978.
80. An intriguing question is whether members in a position of trust ever have
incentives from their supporters to describe provisions of a bill in less than sincere ways.
If one assumes arguendo that the immigration reform bill debated in the Senate during
June 2007 actually does provide a form of amnesty for individuals who had entered the
United States illegally in the past decade, emphatic leadership statements in committee
reports or on the floor that “this is not an amnesty bill” might be preferred by members
who support the bill for all sorts of other reasons. Any such misrepresentations could
still cause reputational damage to the speakers, among other colleagues or more subtly in
the Senate as a whole. Further, such misstatements could be exposed through competing
information sources, as discussed in the next paragraph of text.
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positions when drafting committee reports or floor statements for these
trusted senators and representatives.81
A second institutionally observable condition that can promote speaker
sincerity is the prospect of verification through competition. BLM Rod
refer to the role of the opposition, interest groups, and the media as
competing information sources.82 The participation of nonlegislative actors
in the verification process can be especially important. Viewed collectively,
agencies charged with implementing a new regulatory statute, interest
groups promoting regulation, and entities to be regulated possess
considerable subject matter and technical expertise as well as a diversity
of policy perspectives. Their engagement in the compression process
reduces the likelihood that committee chairs or other key speakers will
inject explanatory statements to undermine, depart from, or misrepresent
the particular meaning or broader thrust of the text.
There is more one could add regarding institutional factors affecting
sincerity,83 but I want to focus on one particular aspect of the authors’
81. Staff typically are recruited to work for particular committee chairs or other
members, and both individual loyalty and congruence of viewpoints are important hiring
considerations in that setting. Considerations of electoral accountability also encourage
members to monitor staff performance so as to detect or avoid conduct that may threaten
their own reputations. Such encouragement is reinforced by the prospect of media
exposure for staff conduct at odds with the member’s stated goals or objectives. These
institutional factors do not guarantee that key committee staff will never draft report
language or floor statements promoting legislative objectives in conflict with the views
of their principals. But any such action by staff to further an independent agenda is
likely to come to their principals’ attention and result in discipline or discharge. See
generally Christine DeGregorio, Staff Utilization in the U.S. Congress: Committee
Chairs and Senior Aides, 28 POLITY 261 (1995) (concluding that members “delegate
selectively, control the extent of delegation in all but the most routine tasks, and delegate
mainly to staffers who have demonstrated loyalty to member[s] over a relatively long
period of working together”).
82. See Boudreau et al., supra note 10, at 978. Apart from legislative statements
by members of the opposition, legislators who are part of the enacting coalition may
contribute their own gloss on a committee report or a floor manager’s statement. These
comments may furnish insights just as concurring opinions sometimes assist the Court in
understanding and applying its own majority decision. See, e.g., First Nat’l Maint. Corp.
v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676–77 (1981) (relying on Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion
in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964)).
83. The authors contend that an important verification prospect stems from
policymaking or substantive committees being “checked” by control committees such as
the House Rules, Appropriations, and Budget Committees. Boudreau et al., supra note
10, at 979. Control committees may perform this checking function in some instances,
but it is worth noting that many major laws affecting public policy in controversial,
litigated ways have no visible price tags. Labor and civil rights laws often simply
establish enforceable rights that do not require specific fiscally-related action from a
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discussion—the role played by ardent and pivotal supporters of pending
legislation. BLM Rod point to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as
an important instance in which pivotal legislators (pivotals), whose
agreement led to an enactable compromise, secured a series of limiting
amendments that left the final text more favorable to employers and
business interests than the bill’s ardent supporters and managers (ardents)
claimed it was.84 Drawing on two prior articles,85 the authors contend
that (i) the relevant statements by ardents in this setting were less
trustworthy than those made by pivotals, and (ii) because liberal judges
relied on this untrustworthy history to help justify expansive readings of
civil rights text, pivotals whose understanding was effectively ignored
by the courts were less willing to participate in civil rights legislation for
more than a decade thereafter.86
The tension between ardents and pivotals raises special concerns about
group intent because both sets of legislators are essential parts of the
enacting coalition. Moreover, both are led by trusted agents whose
statements are likely to reflect what they believe to be true, as they
explain to and on behalf of their respective subgroups how the final
version of text advances or protects the subgroup interests.
BLM Rod do not attempt in this article to justify their assertion that
Title VII pivotal supporters made more trustworthy contributions to the
compression process than did their ardent colleagues with respect to
several major provisions. Although their assertion is highly contestable
as an historical matter,87 I will not join that debate here. I do, however,
control committee. Moreover, even when newly proposed statutes are subject to such
controls, it is not clear whether a control committee’s relevant explanatory statements
will be adequately monitored. Control committees are often less attentive to substantive
elaborations that accompany the fiscal details of their bills, and committee members’
incentives for sincerity may not encourage such monitoring. See generally Brudney,
supra note 4, at 94–97; Elizabeth Garrett, Attention to Context in Statutory Interpretation:
Applying the Lessons of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation to Omnibus Legislation,
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, Nov. 2002, art.
1, at 6–15, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art1.
84. See Boudreau et al., supra note 10, at 980–81.
85. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory
of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its
Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003); Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew McCubbins
& Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Judge as a Fly on the Wall: Interpretive Lessons From the
Positive Political Theory of Legislation (San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper No.
06-12, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=705362.
86. See Boudreau et al., supra note 10, at 981.
87. Compare Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 85, at 1474–98, with ROBERT D.
LOEVY, TO END ALL SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964, at 246–47, 318–21 (1990), CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE
LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 155–56, 184–
89 (1985), David B. Filvaroff & Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Origin and Enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 9, 22–26
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question BLM Rod’s behavioral argument that, once pivotal supporters
perceive their more limiting constructions to have been rejected by
reviewing courts at the expansion stage, they will resist participating in
future legislative compromises addressed to this subject matter area, and
substantial legislative change will therefore become much more difficult
to achieve.
Preliminarily, it is worth noting that Congress embraced federal
legislation protecting civil rights in the employment setting on a regular
basis between the early 1970s and early 1990s. Bipartisan majorities,
including moderates from both parties, enacted at least eight important
statutes to prohibit aspects of employment discrimination based on race,
sex, or age. Some enactments were major or watershed laws,88 while
others were more targeted fixes for a particular problem.89 It is possible,
of course, that even more antidiscrimination laws, or more sweeping
versions of such laws, could have been enacted during these two decades.
But given the political and institutional challenges of legislating at all on
this controversial topic, and the dramatic lack of legislative success in
other areas of employee protection like health care or union
representation, it is difficult to conclude that frustration felt by pivotal
civil rights moderates impeded legislative progress during this period.
More generally, assessing what motivates ardents and pivotals over
the long term involves complex calculations. BLM Rod implicitly
assume that a bill’s supporters—pivotals and ardents—believe reviewing
courts are an important if not the primary audience for their
communications. It is possible that communicative intent regarding civil
rights legislation is something of an outlier in this regard. In contrast to

(Bernard Grofman ed., 2000), and Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., The Role of the Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights in the Civil Rights Struggle of 1963–1964, in THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION 69–
74 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997).
88. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103 (race and sex discrimination); Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55, 74 (age discrimination); Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (age discrimination); Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (race and sex discrimination).
89. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(sex discrimination); Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (age discrimination); Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (age discrimination); Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (sex
discrimination).
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many other substantive areas, most participants (members, staff, and
lobbyists) are lawyers, the subject matter has been heavily litigated for
decades before the Supreme Court, and there are well-articulated agendas
and hot-button disagreements among highly sophisticated interest group
repeat players. Pre-enactment communication on subjects like tax reform,
or on other employment-related issues such as job training or worker
safety, may well be less court-oriented. Incentives for ardents and pivotals
in those settings may relate to how colleagues, constituents, and agencies
will respond rather than to how courts will sift the communicative tea
leaves years later.
Even assuming the relevance of a judicial audience for members of an
enacting coalition, ardents may pay greater attention to this audience
over time than do pivotals. Ardents are, by definition, deeply invested in
the field and its leading issues. They seek committee assignments based
on their policy-related interests, and their continuity in leadership and
oversight roles makes them likely to follow closely how reviewing
courts construe and implement the statutory commands that originated in
their committees. On the other hand, pivotals tend to be short-term
participants from outside the authorizing committee. They are ardents
about one or more other substantive areas, and are likely to be more
attentive to long-term developments in their areas of primary investment.
Pivotals will still participate in legislative bargaining outside their
“ardent” fields, but the rewards are more short-term in context—respect
from colleagues, gratitude of constituents, attention from the media.90 If
anything, it is ardent supporters who may well care more consistently
about the long-term judicial audience, and who might be encouraged to
seek compromise if they believed that courts would look to their more
expansive views when sorting out ambiguous language years later.
This thought experiment on long-term motives is not meant to suggest
that reviewing judges should credit ardents’ communicated understandings
but not pivotals’, based on which subgroup is most likely to be attentive
to the ex post responses of a judicial audience. Such an approach would
be excessively speculative and also unduly cynical. Rather, the key
issue for courts—as BLM Rod maintained earlier—should be to assess
how these legislative conversations contribute to the group’s structured
deliberative processes. In examining the role of pivotals’ expressed
understandings and preferences as part of the communicative exchanges

90. Pivotals are especially likely to lack a long-term perspective on the compromise
legislation if they are not members of the authorizing committee. Pivotals who do serve
on the authorizing committee—typically as minority party members—may have more of
a long-term investment in the subject matter, but even they are likely to help craft
compromise statutes on only an episodic basis.
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that facilitated enactment, courts must consider what can reasonably be
said to have helped induce the majority to issue its statutory command.
Analyses of how future judicial responses might influence subgroups to
behave differently in still later legislative endeavors are of at most
attenuated value when seeking to decode the compression process.
IV. CONCLUSION
It seems appropriate to close with a caveat about the interpretive role
assigned to Congress as communicator. BLM Rod do not argue that
communicative intent must be the primary source of statutory meaning.
In criticizing textualism for ignoring relevant and valuable information
sources, 91 and nonintepretivist theories for disrespecting legislative
supremacy,92 the authors leave for another day issues of hierarchical
ranking among the various competing approaches.
Congressional intent is not a panacea in the interpretive enterprise. At
times, the record of legislative conversations will be silent with respect
to an area of disagreement between the parties. In such circumstances, a
court is likely to seek guidance or enlightenment from other sources,
notably linguistic context or pragmatic consequences. Moreover, as a
statute matures and its original legislative history fades further into the
past, judges may properly come to view such pre-enactment history as
less relevant. They are especially likely to do so when intervening sources
of authority, such as Supreme Court precedent or agency rules, have
arisen to clarify the meaning of enacted text.93
Still, the fact that communicative intent is on occasion of limited
utility should not detract from its core value. BLM Rod have argued
persuasively for the central role of Congress as communicator, and the
consequent relevance to statutory meaning of conversations among
legislators. Considerable work remains to be done in order to shed more
light on the complexities and nuances of compression dynamics, and to
develop guidelines that can help inform the expansion process. Such
work seems likely to yield valuable insights for enhancing and refining
the intentionalist approach as that approach continues to regain influence
in the community of legal and social science scholars.

91.
92.
93.

See Boudreau et al., supra note 10, at 982–83.
See id. at 991.
See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 67, at 224–25.
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